We give a precise characterization of parameter free Σn and Πn induction schemata, IΣ − n and IΠ − n , in terms of reflection principles. This allows us to show that IΠ − n+1 is conservative over IΣ − n w.r.t. boolean combinations of Σn+1 sentences, for n ≥ 1. In particular, we give a positive answer to a question, whether the provably recursive functions of IΠ − 2 are exactly the primitive recursive ones. We also characterize the provably recursive functions of theories of the form IΣn + IΠ − n+1 in terms of the fast growing hierarchy. For n = 1 the corresponding class coincides with the doubly-recursive functions of Peter. We also obtain sharp results on the strength of bounded number of instances of parameter free induction in terms of iterated reflection.
Introduction
In this paper we shall deal with the first order theories containing Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA or, equivalently, I∆ 0 + Exp (cf. [11] ). We are interested in the general question how various ways of formal reasoning correspond to models of computation. This kind of analysis is traditionally based on the concept of provably total recursive function (p.t.r.f.) of a theory. Given a theory T containing EA, a function f ( x) is called provably total recursive in T , iff there is a Σ 1 formula φ( x, y), sometimes called specification, that defines the graph of f in the standard model of arithmetic and such that T ⊢ ∀ x∃!y φ( x, y). * Supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research grant 96-01-01222.
The class of p.t.r.f. of T , denoted F (T ), is one of the most interesting characteristics of T , which somehow describes its power of reasoning about the termination of computations or 'computational strength '. We are going to analyze from this point of view the role of parameters involved in applications of the principle of mathematical induction. Parameter free induction schemata have been introduced and investigated in a number of works by Kaye, Paris, and Dimitracopoulos [13] , Adamowicz and Bigorajska [1] , Ratajczyk [20] , Kaye [12] , and others. IΣ − n is the theory axiomatized over EA by the schema of induction A(0) ∧ ∀x (A(x) → A(x + 1)) → ∀xA(x), for Σ n formulas A(x) containing no other free variables but x, and IΠ − n is similarly defined. (in fact, stronger than IΣ n−1 + IΠ − n ). Furthermore, it is known that IΣ n is a conservative extension of IΣ − n w.r.t. Σ n+2 sentences, although IΣ − n itself only has a B(Σ n+1 ) axiomatization [13] .
In contrast, nontrivial conservation results for IΠ − n , for n > 1, were unknown. In particular, it was unknown, if the provably total recursive functions of IΠ − 2 coincide with the primitive recursive ones (communicated by R. Kaye) . The case of IΠ − 1 (over P A − ) was treated in [13] , where the authors showed that Π 2 consequences of that theory are contained in EA, cf. also [7] .
In this paper we prove that the p.t.r.f. of IΠ ) is similar to a well-known theorem of Parsons [18] (independently proved by Mints and Takeuti) stating that F (IΣ 1 ) coincides with the class of primitive recursive functions, as well. However, the relationship between these two results is nontrivial, because the theories IΠ − 2 and IΣ 1 are incomparable in strength (neither is included in the other). In fact, it is easy to see that the theory IΣ 1 + IΠ − 2 has a larger class of p.t.r.f. than the class of primitive recursive functions. This can be seen from the following characteristic example.
The well-known Ackermann function Ack(x) is defined by double recursion as follows. Ack(x) := g(x, x), where
Ack is known to grow faster than any primitive recursive function (cf. [22] ). The graphs of g and Ack can be naturally defined by Σ 1 formulas, for which one can also verify in EA the inductive definition clauses above. In order to show that Ack is total we prove that the two-argument function g(x, n) is total. A natural proof of the statement ∀n∀x∃y g(x, n) = y goes by induction on n. Notice that the corresponding induction formula is Π 2 and parameter free. However, in order to verify the induction step one must argue that ∀x∃y g(x, n) = y → ∀x∃y g(x, n + 1) = y. This statement is provable by a subordinate Σ 1 induction on x with a parameter n. In other words, the usual argument for the totality of Ackermann function is formalizable in IΣ 1 + IΠ − 2 . Our result shows that any correct argument for the totality of Ack formalizable in Peano arithmetic must involve parameters (or induction formulas outside the class Π 2 ).
Below we shall show that F (IΣ 1 + IΠ − 2 ) actually coincides with the class of doubly-recursive functions of Peter (cf. [22] ). This class can be also characterized as the class corresponding to the ordinal ω 2 of the extended Grzegorczyk (or Fast Growing) hierarchy, and thus involves functions growing much faster than the Ackermann function. It is well-known that F (IΠ 2 ) is the class of multiplyrecursive functions, that is, corresponds in the same sense yet to a bigger ordinal ω ω .
The above example of a natural pair of theories capturing the same class of computable functions, whose union captures a much bigger class, opens the question whether there may exist in general a unique 'most natural' arithmetical theory corresponding to a given computation model. For the case of primitive recursion IΣ 1 was generally held to be such a theory. Now we are confronted with the question, if Σ 1 induction with parameters is more natural than Π 2 induction without parameters. Our answer to this (admittedly, somewhat philosophical) dilemma is that there is more to each of these two theories, than their computational content. Apart from the primitive recursion mechanism, both of them involve some more complex principles of reasoning. Taken together, these principles complement each other in a way that significantly increases their class of p.t.r.f..
The proofs of our results are based on a characterization of parameter free induction schemata in terms of reflection principles and (generalizations of) the conservativity results for local reflection principles obtained in [3] using methods of provability logic. In our opinion, such a relationship presents an independent interest, especially because this seems to be the first occasion when local reflection principles naturally arise in the study of fragments of arithmetic. Using the method of reflection principles we also obtain a number of other results, in particular, sharp characterizations of the strength of bounded number of instances of parameter free induction schemata and some corollaries on the complexity of their axiomatization.
We shall also essentially rely on the results from [4] characterizing the closures of arbitrary arithmetical theories extending EA under Σ n and Π n induction rules. In fact, the results of this paper show that much of the unusual behaviour of parameter free induction schemata can be explained by their tight relationship with the theories axiomatized by induction rules.
The results of Sections 3 and 4 of this paper appeared in [5] .
Preliminaries
We shall work in the language of Peano Arithmetic enriched by a binary predicate symbol of inequality. Bounded or ∆ 0 formulas in this language are those, all of whose quantifier occurrences have the form ∀x (x ≤ t → A(x)) or ∃x (x ≤ t ∧ A(x)), where t is a term not involving x. In EA a function symbol for exponention function 2 x can be introduced [11] ; ∆ 0 (exp) formulas are bounded formulas in the extended language. Σ n and Π n formulas are prenex formulas obtained from the bounded ones by n alternating blocks of similar quantifiers, starting from '∃' and '∀', respectively. B(Σ n ) denotes the class of boolean combinations of Σ n formulas. Σ st n and Π st n denote the classes of Σ n and Π n sentences. St denotes the class of all arithmetical sentences. EA + denotes the extension of EA by a natural Π 2 axiom stating that the iterated exponentiation function is total, or I∆ 0 +Supexp in the terminology of [11, 27] . P RA denotes the standard first order Primitive Recursive Arithmetic.
Next, we establish some useful terminology and notation concerning rules in arithmetic (cf. also [4] ). We say that a rule is a set of instances, that is, expressions of the form
where A 1 , . . . , A n and B are formulas. Derivations using rules are defined in the standard way; T + R denotes the closure of a theory T under a rule R and first order logic. [T, R] denotes the closure of T under unnested applications of R, that is, the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas B such that, for some formulas A 1 , . . . , A n derivable in T , A1,...,An B
is an instance of R. T ≡ U means that theories T and U are deductively equivalent, i.e., have the same set of theorems.
A rule R 1 is derivable from R 2 iff, for every theory T containing EA, T +R 1 ⊆ T + R 2 . A rule R 1 is reducible to R 2 iff, for every theory T containing EA,
. R 1 and R 2 are congruent iff they are mutually reducible (denoted R 1 ∼ = R 2 ). For a theory U containing EA we say that R 1 and R 2 are congruent modulo U , iff for every extension T of U , [T,
Induction rule is defined as follows:
IR:
Whenever we impose a restriction that A(x) only ranges over a certain subclass Γ of the class of arithmetical formulas, this rule is denoted Γ-IR. The theory EA + Σ n -IR will also be denoted IΣ R n . In general, we allow parameters to occur in A, however the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.1. Π n -IR is reducible to parameter free Π n -IR. Σ n -IR is reducible to parameter free Σ n -IR.
Proof. An application of IR for a formula A(x, a) can obviously be reduced to the one for ∀zA(x, z), and this accounts for the Π n case.
On the other hand, if A(x, y, a) is Π n−1 , then an application of Σ n -IR for the formula ∃yA(x, y, a) is reducible, using the standard coding of sequences available in EA, to the one for ∃yA ′ (x, y), where
Indeed, assume that T ⊢ ∃y A(0, y, a), and
Then by (1) and the monotonicity of the coding of sequences, T ⊢ ∃y (1) there is an element z such that A(0, z, (x + 1) 1 ), and we can take for y ′ the sequence y * z ( * denotes concatenation). If (x + 1) 0 > 0, then the code of the pair p := (x + 1) 0 − 1, (x + 1) 1 is strictly less than x + 1, and thus, by the induction hypothesis, there is a z = (y) p such that
Reflection principles, for a given r.e. theory T containing EA, are defined as follows. The uniform reflection principle is the schema
where Prov T (·) denotes a canonical provability predicate for T . The local reflection principle is the schema
Partial reflection principles are obtained from the above schemata by imposing a restriction that A belongs to one of the classes Γ of the arithmetic hierarchy (denoted Rfn T (Γ) and RFN T (Γ), respectively). It is known that, due to the existence of partial truthdefinitions, the schema RFN T (Π n ) is equivalent to a single Π n sentence over EA. In particular, RFN T (Π 1 ) is equivalent to the consistency assertion Con T for T . See [24, 14, 3] for some basic information about reflection principles. In addition we note the following facts: [27, 4] , and IΣ n ≡ EA + RFN EA (Π n+2 ), for all n ≥ 1 [15, 17, 11] .
We shall also consider the following metareflection rule:
.
We let Π m -RR(Π n ) denote the above rule with the restriction that P is a Π m sentence. Main results (Theorems 1, 2 and 3) of [4] can then be reformulated as follows.
Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2.
Since [EA, Σ n -IR] contains IΣ n−1 , the second claim of this proposition implies that the rules Π n+1 -RR(Π n+1 ) and Σ n -IR are interderivable, for all n ≥ 1. Also notice that Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 imply the following result of Parsons [19] :
, for all n ≥ 1.
Characterizing parameter free induction by reflection principles
Having in mind the exact correspondence between parametric induction schemata and uniform reflection principles over EA, it seems natural to conjecture that parameter free induction should correspond to parameter free, that is, local reflection principles. However, it is also well-known that local reflection schemata per se are too weak: e.g., Rfn EA is contained in the extension of EA by the set of all true Π 1 sentences, yet none of the schemata IΠ − n for n > 1 satisfies this property. It turns out that in order to obtain a sharp characterization of parameter free induction one has to relativize the provability operator.
For n ≥ 1, Π n (N) denotes the set of all true Π n sentences. True Πn (x) denotes a canonical truthdefinition for Π n sentences, that is, a Π n formula naturally defining the set of Gödel numbers of Π n (N) sentences in EA. True Πn (x) provably in EA satisfies Tarski satisfaction conditions (cf [11] ), and therefore, for every formula
Tarski's truth lemma ( * ) is formalizable in EA, in particular,
where Π st n is a natural elementary definition of the set of Gödel numbers of Π n sentences in EA. We also assume w.l.o.g. that
Let T be an r.e. theory containing EA. A provability predicate for the theory T + Π n (N) can be naturally defined, e.g., by the following Σ n+1 formula:
Lemma 3.1.
1. For each Σ n+1 formula A(x 1 , . . . , x n ),
Prov
Πn T (x) satisfies Löb's derivability conditions in T :
Proof. Statement 1 follows from ( * ). Statement 2 follows from Statement 1, Tarski satisfaction conditions, and is essentially well-known (cf. [25] ), q.e.d.
We define
For n = 0 all these schemata coincide, by definition, with their nonrelativized counterparts.
Lemma 3.2. For all n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1, the following schemata are deductively equivalent over EA:
Proof. (i) Observe that, using ( * * ),
The latter formula clearly follows from RFN T (Σ n ), but it also implies RFN T (Σ n ), and hence RFN T (Π n+1 ), by ( * ).
(ii) By formalized Deduction theorem,
Hence, over EA,
Proof. All statements are proved similarly, respectively relying upon Propositions 2.2 and 2.1, so we shall only elaborate the proof of the first one. For the inclusion (⊆) we have to derive
for each Σ n formula A(x) with the only free variable x. Let P denote the Π n+1 sentence (logically equivalent to) A(0)∧∀x(A(x) → A(x+1)). Then, by external induction on n it is easy to see that, for each n, EA + P ⊢ A(n). This fact is formalizable in EA, therefore
By Lemma 3.2 we conclude that
⊢ ∀xA(x), by (4).
It follows that EA + Rfn
Πn EA (Σ n+1 ) ⊢ P → ∀xA(x), as required. For the inclusion (⊇) we observe that, for any Π n+1 sentence P , the theory IΣ − n + P contains P + Σ n -IR by Lemma 2.1, and hence
by Proposition 2.2. It follows that
and Lemma 3.2 (ii) yields the result, q.e.d. Proof. The proof of this theorem makes use of a purely modal logical lemma concerning Gödel-Löb provability logic GL (cf e.g. [8, 25] ). Recall that GL is formulated in the language of propositional calculus enriched by a unary modal operator . The expressions ♦φ and + φ are the standard abbreviations for ¬ ¬φ and φ ∧ φ, respectively. Axioms of GL are all instances of propositional tautologies in this language together with the following schemata:
Rules of GL are moduls ponens and φ ⊢ φ (necessitation).
By an arithmetical realization of the language of GL we mean any function (·)
* that maps propositional variables to arithmetical sentences. For a modal formula φ, (φ) * T denotes the result of substituting for all the variables of φ the corresponding arithmetical sentences and of translating as the provability predicate Prov T ( · ). Under this interpretation, axioms L1, L2 and the necessitation rule can be seen to directly correspond to the three Löb's derivability conditions, and axiom L3 is the formalization of Löb's theorem. It follows that, for each modal formula φ, GL ⊢ φ implies T ⊢ (φ) * T , for every realization (·)
* of the variables of φ. The opposite implication, for the case of a Σ 1 sound theory T , is also valid; this is the content of the important arithmetical completeness theorem for GL due to Solovay (cf [8] ).
For us it will also be essential that GL is sound under the interpretation of as a relativized provability predicate. For an arithmetical realization (·) * , we let (φ) * T +Πn(N ) denote the result of substituting for all the variables of φ the corresponding arithmetical sentences and of translating as Prov Πn T ( · ). The following lemma is a corollary of Lemma 3.1 and the fact that (formalized) Löb's theorem for relativized provability follows by the usual fixed-point argument from the derivability conditions.
* of the variables of φ.
The opposite implication, that is, the arithmetical completeness of GL w.r.t. the relativized provability interpretation is also well-known (cf. [25] ). Yet, below we do not use this fact.
The following crucial lemma is a modification of a similar lemma in [3] .
Lemma 4.2. Let modal formulas Q i be defined as follows:
where p is a propositional variable. Then, for any variables p 0 , . . . , p m ,
Proof. Rather than exhibiting an explicit proof of the formula above, we shall argue semantically, using a standard Kripke model characterization of GL.
Recall that a Kripke model for GL is a triple (W, R, ), where 1. W is a finite nonempty set;
2. R is an irreflexive partial order on W ;
3. is a forcing relation between elements (nodes) of W and modal formulas such that
φ ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ W (xRy ⇒ y φ).
Theorem 4 on page 95 of [8] (originally proved by Segerberg) states that a modal formula is provable in GL, iff it is forced at every node of any Kripke model of the above kind. This provides a useful criterion for showing provability in GL. Consider any Kripke model (W, R, ) in which the conclusion (
is false at a node x ∈ W . This means that x p and x Q i → Q i , for each i ≤ m. An obvious induction on i then shows that x Q i for all i ≤ m + 1, in particular, x Q m+1 .
Unwinding the definition of Q i we observe that in W there is a sequence of nodes x = x m+1 Rx m R . . . Rx 0 such that, for all i ≤ m + 1, x i Q i . Since R is irreflexive and transitive, all x i 's are pairwise distinct. Moreover, it is easy to see by induction on i that, for all i,
Hence, for each i ≤ m + 1, x i p.
Now we notice that each formula p i → p i can be false at no more than one node of the chain x m+1 , . . . , x 0 . Therefore, by Pigeon-hole Principle, there must exist a node z among the m + 2 nodes x i such that
In case z coincides with x = x m+1 we have
In case z = x i , for some i ≤ m, we have xRz by transitivity of R, and thus
This shows that the formula in question is forced at every node of any Kripke model; hence it is provable in GL, q.e.d.
Lemma 4.3.
For any n ≥ 0, the following schemata are deductively equivalent over EA: Rfn
Proof. We prove that
for any boolean combination of Σ n+1 sentences φ. The formula φ is equivalent to a formula of the form n i=1 (π i ∨ σ i ), for some sentences π i ∈ Π n+1 σ i ∈ Σ n+1 . Since the provability predicate Prov Πn T ( · ) commutes with conjunction, it is sufficient to derive in EA + Rfn
Now we complete our proof of Theorems 2 and 3. Assume T + Rfn
Πn T ⊢ A, where A is a B(Σ n+1 ) sentence. Then there are finitely many instances of relativized local reflection that imply A, that is, for some arithmetical sentences A 0 , . . . , A m , we have
Since the relativized provability predicate satisfies Löb's derivability conditions, we also obtain
Considering an arithmetical realization (·)
* that maps the variable p to the sentence A and p i to A i , for each i, by Lemma 4.2 we conclude that
where B i denote the formulas (Q i ) * T +Πn(N ) . Now we observe that, if A ∈ B(Σ n+1 ), then for all i, B i ∈ B(Σ n+1 ). Hence Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 and the fact that IΣ n is Σ n+2 conservative over IΣ − n [13] , q.e.d.
Remark 4.1. Perhaps somewhat more naturally, conservation results for relativized local reflection principles can be stated modally within a certain bimodal system GLB due to Japaridze, with the operators and 1 , that describes the joint behaviour of the usual and the relativized provability predicate (cf [8] ). Using a suitable Kripke model characterization of GLB, one can semantically prove that
where the formulas Q i are now understood w.r.t. the modality 1 , and this yields Theorem 3 almost directly.
Further conservation and axiomatization results
The characterization of parameter free induction in terms of reflection principles (Theorem 1) actually reveals other interesting information about these schemata.
The following theorem, which is a corollary of a relativized version of another conservation result for local reflection principles (due, essentially, to Goryachev [10] ), gives a characterization of Π n+1 consequences of IΣ (
Proof. Statement (ii) follows from (i). The proof of (i) relies on the fact that our characterization of parameter free induction schemata in terms of reflection principles respects the number of instances of these schemata.
there is a Π n+2 sentence P such that P → RFN EA+P (Π n+1 ) implies B over EA. Vice versa, for every such P there is an instance B of IΠ − n+1 such that EA+B proves P → RFN EA+P (Π n+1 ).
Proof. This is easy to check by inspection of our proof of Theorem 1. For the 'vice versa' part we employ Proposition 2.1 (1) stating that
Also notice that any finite number of unnested applications of Π n+1 -IR can be obviously merged into a single one, which, in turn, is reducible to a single instance of IΠ Let ⊥ denote the boolean constant 'falsum'.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2 we have
Then, substituting in the above formula ⊥ for p, observe that
and therefore
The following lemma is a relativization of Goryachev's theorem [10] .
Lemma 5.3. The theory axiomatized over T by any m instances of Rfn
Proof. Let U be a theory axiomatized over T by m instances of relativized local reflection, say Prov
and, by Löb's derivability conditions,
By Lemma 5.2 we then obtain
by Lemma 3.1 (1) . Statement (i) of Lemma 3.2 implies that, for all i,
Theorem 4 (i) obviously follows from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3, q.e.d.
Remark 5.2. The first statement of Theorem 4 is also valid for n = 0, but only over EA + rather than EA. A proof is similar, using Theorem 1 (iii). For EA a similar characterization can be obtained using bounded cut-rank provability a là Wilkie and Paris [27] , cf. also [4] .
The following corollary was first proved model-theoretically in [13] . 
Hence, by Theorem 1, Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is such an extension. We may assume w.l.o.g. that it has the form T + U , for some m instances U of IΠ − n+1 , where T is a finite Π n+2 axiomatized extension of EA. Then, by Theorem 5, Π n+1 consequences of T + U are provable in (T ) n+1 m for some finite m. Yet, by the second claim of the same theorem,
The latter formula is Π n+1 and unprovable in (T ) n+1 m , q.e.d. We also obtain the following statement.
is not contained in any consistent extension of EA by an r.e. set of Π n+2 sentences.
Proof. By Theorem 1 IΠ − n+1 contains the schema Rfn Πn EA (Σ n+2 ) and thus the weaker schema Rfn EA (Σ n+2 ). The result follows by the well-known Unboundedness theorem for local reflection (cf. [14, 3] ) stating that no consistent Π m axiomatized r.e. extension of EA contains Rfn EA (Σ m ), q.e.d.
Notice that the complexity of the natural axiomatization of IΠ 
Notice that IΠ
follows from the fact that IΠ − n+1 has a Σ n+2 axiomatization, whereas IΣ n contains RFN EA (Π n+2 ) (Leivant [15] ). IΣ 
Parameter free induction and fast growing functions
Classes of p.t.r.f. of theories containing EA are often measured in terms of the extended Grzegorczyk (or Fast Growing) hierarchy. We fix a canonical fundamental sequences assignment for limit ordinals < ε 0 based on Cantor normal form (see [22] ). α[n] denotes the n-th term of the fundamental sequence for an ordinal α. If the Cantor normal form of a limit ordinal α is α 0 + ω β , then
For this fundamental sequences assignment, a hierarchy of functions F α , for α < ε 0 , is defined as follows.
As usual F (n) (x) denotes the n-fold iteration of a function F (x), that is, the expression F (F (. . . F (x) . . .)) (n times).
Classes of functions E α , for α < ε 0 (the extended Grzegorczyk hierarchy), are defined as follows.
where E(K) denotes the elementary closure of a class K, that is, the closure of K and all elementary functions under composition and bounded recursion. For 3 ≤ α < ω the classes E α thus defined coincide with the classes E α of the familiar Grzegorczyk hierarchy. In particular, E 3 is the class of Kalmar elementary functions, and E ω is the class of primitive recursive functions. E ω k coincides with the class of k-recursive functions in the sense of Peter (see [21, 16] ). It is well-known that E ε0 coincides with the class of p.t.r.f. of Peano Arithmetic (Kreisel-Schwichtenberg-Wainer), see [9] for a modern self-contained exposition. The results of Parsons in combination with those of Tait (see e.g. [22, 19] ) sharpen this to F (IΣ n ) = E ωn , for each n ≥ 1, where we define
and ω n := ω n (1). From Corollary 4.2 we thus immediately infer the following result.
The characterization of p.t.r.f. of the theories of the form IΣ n + IΠ − n+1 is more interesting.
, that is, coincides with the class of doubly-recursive functions of Peter.
Proof. For a proof of this theorem, in addition to the results of the previous section, we apply the machinery of transfinitely iterated reflection principles. This topic goes back to the works of Turing and Feferman. Essential ingredients for our proof are contained in the works [23, 2] and particularly [26] . Neither Schmerl, nor Sommer present all technical details in their papers, therefore the reader is also referred to their Ph.D. theses cited therein.
First, following Sommer [26] , we represent the system of ordinal notation up to ε 0 by bounded arithmetical formulas 2 in such a way that basic properties of ordinal functions and Cantor normal forms become provable in EA. Then we construct a bounded formula F α (x) ≃ y of the variables α, x, y that uniformly represents the graphs of the functions in the Fast Growing hierarchy as defined above. For these formulas one can verify basic monotonicity properties and functionality property in EA. As in [26] , p. 285, we then define the theories S α , for α < ε 0 , as follows:
S α := EA + {∀x∃y F 3+β (x) ≃ y | β < α}.
As a corollary of Herbrand's Theorem (or Proposition 6.4 in [26] ) we obtain the following statement.
Proposition 6.1. For all α < ε 0 , F (S α ) = E 3+α .
Proposition 6.10 of [26] can then be reformulated as follows.
Proposition 6.2. Provably in EA, ∀α < ε 0 S α ≡ EA + {RFN S β (Π 2 ) | β < α}.
Uniqueness Lemma 2.3 of [2] formulated for iterated consistency assertions holds for iterated Π 2 reflection principles with the same proof. It implies that there is only one, up to EA-provable equivalence, sequence of theories S α satisfying the statement of the previous proposition. This means that the theories S α coincide with the hierarchy of transfinitely iterated uniform Π 2 reflection principles built up over EA along the canonical system of ordinal notation in the sense of [23, 2] .
More precisely (see [2] ), for a given ∆ 0 (exp) well-ordering representation, an initial theory T , and a fixed n ≥ 1, there is a ∆ 0 (exp) formula Ax T (α, x) numerating in EA the axioms of a theory denoted by (T ) n α such that, provably in EA, ∀α < ε 0 (T )
Actually, the equivalence above can be viewed as a fixed point equation implicitly defining Ax T (α, x). By Lemma 2.3 of [2] , for a fixed initial theory T and a well-ordering representation, such a sequence of theories is defined uniquely up to EA-provable equivalence. So, applying this to the canonical well-ordering representation up to ε 0 we obtain Proposition 6.3. Provably in EA,
By the same Uniqueness lemma, the transfinite progression of iterated reflection principles over primitive recursive arithmetic, (P RA) n+1 α , coincides with the one considered in Schmerl [23] , which he denotes n α . By inspection of the so-called Fine Structure theorem ([23] , page 347) it is not too difficult to convince oneself that its proof works for EA, as well as for P RA, and to obtain the following statement. (A more general form of this theorem with a new proof will appear in [6] .) (In fact, the mutual Π n conservativity above holds provably in EA + , uniformly in α, β.) Now we are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 9. Since IΣ n is a finitely Π n+2 axiomatizable theory, Theorem 5 implies that IΣ n + IΠ − n+1 is Π n+1 conservative over (IΣ n ) n+1 ω . But IΣ n is equivalent to (EA) 
